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NOTES
DISCOVERY: BOON OR BURDEN?
This Note is an analysis of the practical operation of discovery
techniques in federal district court, founded principally on the
Minnesota district. It is presented for three reasons. First, it may
have value to practitioners in Minnesota who hitherto have not
encountered the federal discovery rules.' Second, the cases analyzed
are of the type and background of those normally arising in state
district courts. Third, the relatively uncrowded Minnesota district
dockets present a favorable medium for the study of the function-
1. As of January 1, 1952, Minnesota district courts have been using
Rules of Civil Procedure based on, and with only minor variations from, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The changes concerning the taking of
depositions are: the inclusion of an express expense limitation in Rule 30.02;
the addition of a provision relating to arbitration procedure in Rule 26.07;
the insertion of a clause protecting an attorney's "work-product" from dis-
covery, in Rule 26.02.
NOTES
ing of discovery.2 No extended effort will be made to cover dis-
covery procedures generally 3 or to collate the results obtained
herein with the other statistical studies available in the field.4
I. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DiscovERY
A. Function of Appellate and Trial Courts
One principal impression is derived from the rulings on dis-
covery which have been made in the Minnesota federal district:
practical flexible operation exists because the trial courts have kept
themselves free from formalistic method. Discovery is not suscep-
tible to a traditional legal approach because it is based on factual,
not legal, relationships and because its rulings must be founded on
incomplete information. And too, the factors of expense, annoy-
ance, oppression and embarrassment which are considered in dis-
covery are not matters of cognizance in the determination of the
controlling substantive law of a case. Additionally, discovery rulings
are of an interlocutory nature and are not normally appealable,'
and if the trial courts can be relied upon to rule independently those
rulings should not be controlled by appellate precedents. The in-
cursion of the United States Supreme Court into this domain,
therefore, may justify some perturbation. In Hickman v. Taylor-
the Supreme Court stated that the work product of a lawyer in
the preparation of a case was protected from the discovery tech-
niques.7 In doing so it exercised the appellate function in customary
2. The 1950 Report of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, the Table C 5, at p. 155, shows that 48.7% of civil cases which go
to trial are disposed of in less than 6 months, and that the median time
for such cases is 7.1 months.
3. A thorough coverage is given by Note, 31 Minn. Law Rev. 712 (1947).
See also Dyer-Smith, Federal Examination Before Trial (1939) ; Holtzoff,
Instrunets of Discoz'ery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Mich.
L. Rev. 205 (1942); Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Dis-
covcry Procedure, 38 Col. L. Rev. 1179, 1436 (1938); Sunderland, Dis-
covery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 737
(1939).
4. Ragland, Discovery Before Trial (1932) ; Speck, The Use of Dis-
covery in United States District Courts, 60 Yale L. J. 1132 (1951) ; Note,
59 Yale L. J. 117 (1949) (analyzing statistics of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts).
5. See Note, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 712 n. 1 (1947).
6. 329 U. S. 495 (1947).
7. The case arose on a contempt hearing for refusal to obey the trial
court's order. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02 (1952) provides: "The production or
inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his
attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in
preparation for trial, or of any writing that reflects an attorney's mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in
Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert, shall not be required."
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fashion since it verbally handled the problem as if it were one of
substantive law.8 Such thinking could in time nullify the value of
discovery by substituting precedent for the sound judgment of the
trial judge and by providing a means of evasion and circumvention
for the legal fraternity. What:ever the reaction in other districts,9
however, the district court of Minnesota has shown an awareness
of, but no apparent pressure from, Hickman v. Taylor. In Nelson
v. Western Electric Co.,'0 where the defendant objected to dis-
covery of statements obtained by a claim manager, the court clearly
indicated that its judgment of the situation before it was not to be
destroyed by any overruling compulsive force from the Hickman
case."1 The court gives thorough consideration to all the factors
which affect discovery of information in a case. 12
B. Special Leave for the Taking of Depositions
A plaintiff can, with leave of court, take depositions before the
twenty-day period required by the Rules has elapsed.'3 The cause
he need show to get such permission is in some doubt: it may be
that the rule is intended to protect only the defendant who has not
had time to get a lawyer,14 and it may be that exceptional circum-
8. The common law privilege of immunity from confidential disclosures
is perhaps a substantive right. The Court, however, after saying the instru-
ments in question were not privileged, held that discovery could not be had
on grounds of public policy under the showing made by the party seeking it.
This was therefore an overruling of the trial court on its judgment of the
facts, but couched in such broad terms that to properly limit the holding
to its facts is impossible. It should be noted that discovery must be pro-
cedural to be within the rule-mating power. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U. S. 1 (1941).
9. The Hickman case is cited, or qualified, or commented upon in a great
number of the discovery rulings. It has also evoked a considerable response
among the academic brethren. See, e.g., Taine, Discovery of Trial Prepara-
tions in the Federal Courts, 50 Col. L. Rev. 1026 (1950) ; Notes, 31 Minn. L.
Rev. 712, 731 (1947), 62 Harv. L. Rev. 269 (1948); 42 Ill. L. Rev. 238
(1948) ; 32 Iowa L. Rev. 580 (1948).
10. Civil No. 1664, D. Minn. 3d Div., Oct. 23, 1950.
11. It said, after quoting from the Hickman case, "It is important to
make certain that the statements in question do not constitute the 'work product
of the lawyer' directing preparation for and trial of defendant's case. Based
on the files and proceedings herein, I have concluded that the production
of statements signed by such witnesses at the instance of a claim agent or
claims manager of defendant or its insurer, seems proper. The delivery of
such statements to defendant's counsel, under the existing circumstances, does
not insulate them with the shield of privilege." [Emphasis supplied.]
12. See United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F. R. D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949).
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ; Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.01 (1952).
14. Keller-Dorian Colorfilm Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 9 F. R. D.
432 (S.D. N.Y. 1949). After a reasoned analysis of the 1948 Amendment
to the Rules the court reached this conclusion primarily because of the Re-
viser's Note, given in 5 F. R. D. 453.
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stances are needed.1" Among the exceptional circumstances which
all recognize is the determination of preliminary questions of juris-
diction, venue and service, 16 but use of discovery by the defendant
does not mean waiver of lack of jurisdiction.' 7 If parties proceed
without leave of court during this period, the court, which other-
wise could limit the scope of the questioning to the preliminary
issue involved, might refuse to supervise disputes arising out of
the taking of the depositions.'" In any event, where there is no
agreement defendant will usually raise the defense of harassment to
requests to take early depositions. In the few situations in which
the problem has been pre'sented to the Minnesota federal district
court it has either delayed decision until it was no longer neces-
sary, or has not provided a written opinion.
C. Objections to Interrogatories and Motions to Compel Answers
Perhaps the most important single factor in the efficient opera-
tion of the discovery rules is the handling of objections to inter-
rogatories and motions to compel answers.' 9 In this regard the Min-
nesota district court has utilized a practical approach. Without any
noted exceptions, its rulings manifest careful consideration, even
where multiple objections were made to numerous interrogatories.
While the general rule permits questions which may reasonably
lead to something relevant, thus eliminating the defense of "fish-
ing expedition," still irrelevance and immateriality may be objec-
tionable, particularly where other defects are also present.2 0 Other
15. 2%. P. M. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 15 Fed. R. Serv.
496 (S.D. N.Y. 1951). The view may be a holdover from pre-Amendment
cases, or an attempt to discourage excessive motions before the court and
races for the taking of depositions.
16. Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, 92 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. N.Y.
1950) ; Silk v. Sieling, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1947); See Com-
mentary, Discovery on Jurisdictional Issues, 9 Fed. R. Serv. 979 (1946).
17. Blank v. Bitker, 135 F. 2d 962 (7th Cir. 1943).
18. Application of Wisconsin Alumni Foundation, 4 F. R. D. 263 (D.
N.J. 1945). The reasons for refusing would lose some of their forcefulness
after a stipulation on the taking of questions was no longer needed.
19. The many problems involved in the taking of depositions and inter-
rogatories are treated in: 4 Moore, Federal Practice §§ 26-33 (2d ed. 1950) ;
Cushman, Depositions in Practice, 3 Miami L. Q. 378 (1949) ; Freedman,
Discoveryt' as an Instrument of Justice, 22 Temp. L. Q. 174 (1948) ; Note,
31 Minn. L. Rev. 712 (1947) ; 23 Minn. L. Rev. 694 (1939).
20. Henderson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., Civil No. 2038, D.
Minn. 3d Div., Oct. 22, 1951; Lange v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., Civil
No. 565, D. Minn. 2d Div., Dec. 1, 1949; H. J. Heinz v. Great Northern Ry.,
Civil No. 2711, D. Minn. 4th Div., Sept. 13, 1948.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
objections familiar to the law of evidence may also be sustained.-'
If a question seeks a legal theory of defense or conclusions22 or
if a question is so worded that it compels a party to admit some-
thing he does not concede, 23 the court may consider it objection-
able. Peculiar to the interrogatory is the objection that the answer
is one of common knowledge or is as well known to the interro-
gator as to the objector.2 4 The defenses of harassment, oppression
and annoyance created by the Rules have not been explicitly
defined.
2 5
A deponent or a party opponent may be asked whether he has
knowledge of certain documents and if so to provide copies of those
documents. This is properly a request for production of documents
and should be made under Rule 34.26 And this applies as well to
written statements, also treated as "documents." 27 But there is
no complete bar, as is evidenced by Schuh v. Prudential Ins. Co.*- -
In that case, defendant's interrogatories inquired as to some let-
ters specifically, others generally, and asked for copies. Plaintiff
objected, contending this was too general and also within the
scope of Rule 34. The court held it was not too general under the
21. H. J. Heinz Co. v. Great Northern Ry., Civil No. 2711, D. Minn.
4th Div., Sept. 13, 1948. The objection was on the grounds of hearsay, as to
the operation of connecting lines, and it was sustained but the party was
directed to answer to the best of his information and belief as to information
its agents had acquired.
22. Henderson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., Civil No. 2038, D. Minn.
3d Div., Oct. 22, 1951.
23. H. J. Heinz v. Great Northern Ry., Civil No. 2711, D. Minn. 4th
Div., Sept. 13, 1948.
24. Ouradnik v. Chicago, Great Western Ry., Civil No. 1467, D. Minn.
3d Div., April 5, 1948. The court in this case directed as well that the time
of answering the interrogatories be shortened, as the case would come on
for trial before an answer would normally arrive.
25. In the most questionable interrogatory found, plaintiff in a per-
sonal injury suit after taking 260 pages of depositions served 974 interroga-
tories under Rule 33, asking for detailed explanations of defendant's plant
operations. The case was settled before the court ruled on defendant's objec-
tions, so that the court did not have a chance to rule upon imposing a limita-
tion. Notice, however, that a party who poses such questions is running a con-
siderable risk of wasting his time because of possible inability to compel
answers.
26. Ouradnik v. Chicago, Great Western Ry., Civil 'No. 1467, D. Minn.
3d Div., April 5, 1948.
27. Kenops v. Union Freightways, Inc., Civil No. 1714, D. Minn. 3d
Div., Sept. 29, 1950; Alltmont v. United States, 177 F. 2d 971 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 967 (1950) ; cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 505
(1947).
28. Civil No. 3394, D. Minn. 4th Div., Sept. 11, 1950.
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facts and that plaintiff had to produce the originals, though only
for photostating.2 '
Nothing in these cases, individually or as a whole, justifies a
conclusion that confusion exists.30 Rather, the impression which
is gained is one of a system concerned chiefly with immediate ap-
plications and responsive to a great many practical factors.31
D. Taxing of Costs Involved in the Taking of Depositions
Costs of depositions clearly necessary to the trial of a case are
taxable to the opposing losing party.32 But how the element of
necessity is to be evaluated is a matter of dispute. It seems logical
to view it in the light of the time of the taking and presentation of
the depositions,33 but, beyond this, necessity can be interpreted
as requiring anything from mere good faith in the taking34 to
actual offering or reading in evidence. 35 The position of the Minne-
sota district court in this matter is that taxation of costs is discre-
tionary with the trial court and that depositions not put into evi-
dence which aid only he counsel taking, giving him an "over-all
view of the general facts of the lawsuit," are distinguishable from
those "intended to be used to facilitate the determination of the
case" and hence are not taxable as costs.36 A fortification for this
29. See Note, 35 Iowa L. Rev. 422 (1950).
30. For observations of the local bench and bar on the operation of
discovery see Section II, infra.
31. Most decisions, for example, involve a number of questions which
are objected to on a variety of grounds. The court usually sustains or over-
rules the objections without specifying the grounds in writing or adding
any comment.
32. Schmitt v. Continental-Diamond Fibre Co., 1 F. R. D. 109 (N.D.
Ill. 1940). This is true even though a pre-trial hearing has made the use
of the deposition unnecessary, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fruit Growers
Service Co., 5 Fed. R. Serv. 643 (E.D. Wash. 1941), or if the decision was
by summary judgment, Curacao Trading Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 137 F. 2d
911 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 765 (1944). If there was a stipu-
lation as to costs of depositions it is controlling even though the depositions
were not used. Liebert v. Netherlands Am. Steam Navigation Co., 5 Fed.
R. Serv. 431 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
33. Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 7 Fed. R. Serv. 514 (N.D.
Ill. 1943).
34. National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 93 F. Supp.
349 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), refld on other grounds, 191 F. 2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
35. Amerman v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 9 Fed. R. Serv. 533 (D.
Mont. 1945), interpreting a local court rule.
36. Republic Machine Tool Corp. v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 9 Fed
R. Serv. 534, 436 (D. Minn. 1946) ; cf. Copeman Laboratories Co. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 89 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Mich. 1950) ; Brainard v. Joy Mfg.
Co., 14 Fed. R. Serv. 488 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (memo of clerk).
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reasoning and result is found in a district of Nebraska case in
which the depositions, although proper preparation for trial and
used slightly for impeachment, were not "critically significant in
the submission of the case" and thus were held to be not taxable
as costs.3 7 Both courts distinguished as having added considera-
tions the principal cases holding costs taxable,38 and were on solid
ground in doing so. In the taxation of costs, perhaps more than in
any other field in discovery, the judgment of the trial judge as to
the entirety of the case should be controlling as it is extremely un-
likely anyone can weigh and verbalize all the imponderables and
thus rationalize the seemingly inconsistent cases.39
Perhaps it is basically incorrect that counsel should abuse but
clients should pay, as when there is a refusal to answer without
substantial justification. 40 A powerful impetus to happy operation
of the discovery rules is provided by one ruling that an attorney
who disregarded an order requiring answers had to pay the $100
fee of the opposing attorney himself.41
E. Motions to Produce Documents Under Rule 34
Two cases from the Minnesota district illustrate the practical
approach to motions under Rule 34 and the major requirements for
their use. In Schuh v. Prudential Ins. Co.4 2 plaintiff had asked for
a carte blanche to investigate the records of the defendant insur-
ance company, stating that he expected to find much of value there.
After determining that plaintiff had no definite line on where he
was going the court denied the motion, criticizing the indiscriminate
technique and telling plaintiff he might take his depositions first to
37. Andresen v. Clear Ridge Aviation, Inc., 12 Fed. R. Serv. 628, 636(D. Neb. 1949). The court also held that where plaintiffs deliberately con-
cealed themselves they were liable for added costs of serving the subpoenas.
38. W. F. & John Barnes Co. v. International Harvester Co., 145 F.
2d 915 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 850 (1945) ; Harris v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 139 F. 2d 571 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Gotz v.
Universal Products Co., 3 F. R. D. 155 (D. Del. 1943) ; Schmitt v.
Continental-Diamond Fibre Co., 1 F. R. D. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1940).
39. Compare Hartig v. Schnoecknecht, 11 F. R. D. 166 (D. Conn. 1951)
and Donato v. Parker Pen Co., 9 Fed. R. Serv. 533 (E.D. N.Y. 1945) with
Republic Machine Tool Corp. v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 9 Fed. R. Serv.
534 (D. Minn. 1946).
40. Bellavance v. Frank Morrow Co., 2 F. R. D. 118 (D. R.I. 1941);
cf. Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 7 F. R. D. 341
(N.D. Cal. 1947).
41. Allen v. United States, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 37b.21 Case 1 (E.D. Pa.
1951). This sort of thing cannot be expected to engender much enthusiasm
in the organized bar.
42. Civil No. 3394, D. Minn. 4th Div., Sept. 11, 1950.
I
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ascertain what he wanted.4 3 In Hudalla v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
P. R. R. 4 4 plaintiff sought a copy of a statement he had previously
given to defendant's claim agent. The court, in a considered analy-
sis of the "good cause" requirement of the rule, held that good
cause must be shown affirmatively and that a mere possibility of
variance in plaintiff's earlier story did not of itself satisfy the re-
quirement. Special circumstances must be stated, not bare allega-
tions. The court refused to follow other decisions which passed
lightly over good cause 4' but its actual denial was on the "insuffi-
ciency of factual bases" and the "stereotyped" claim of necessity.
The practical nature of such a ruling is self-evident. 46
Majority practice now, after early objections on constitutional
grounds,4 7 regards expense or burden on the party involved as no
objection to the discovery of documents.48 But if the court feels
that the information asked for is unnecessary to the claim or out
of all proportion to the case it may take a stricter view.49
43. This is similar to the prevalent practice of suggesting use of dis-
covery instead of a motion to make pleadings more definite and certain.
See Bowles v. Sigel, 5 F. R. D. 108 (D. Minn. 1946) ; Schempf v. Armour
& Co., 5 F. R. D. 294 (D. Minn. 1946).
44. 10 F. R. D. 363 (D. Minn. 1950).
45. The court cited Dugger v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 5 F. R. D. 334
(E.D. N.Y. 1946); Barreca v. Pennsylvania R.R., 5 F. R. D. 391 (E.D.
N.Y. 1946); Tague v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 5 F. R. D. 337 (E.D. N.Y.
1946); Ryan v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 5 F. R. D. 399 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
46. More often comment and a rationale are omitted. E.g., Crepeau v.
Northern Pac. Ry., Civil No. 2014, D. Minn. 3d Div., Oct. 5, 1951, where
the court granted the production of the names of all of defendant's em-
ployees and the names of all accounts affecting plaintiff but denied infor-
mation as to type of business done, production of profit and loss statements,
balance sheets, files, and memos used to refresh recollection during the
taking of depositions; Henderson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., Civil No.
2038, D. Minn. 3d Div., Oct. 22, 1951, where motion for production of a
drawing of the yards and defendant's rules for employees was granted, but
a report of defendant's maintenance department on the cause of the accident
was denied.
47. Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 2 Fed. R. Serv.
380 (W.D. M o. 1939); cf. Carter Bros., Inc. v. Cannon, 45 F. Supp. 679
(E.D. Tenn. 1942).
48. Michel v. Meier, 8 F. R. D. 464 (W.D. Pa. 1948) ; Hirshhorn v.
Mine Safety Appliances Co., 8 F. R. D. 11 (W.D. Pa. 1948) ; see Hercules
Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 4 F. R. D. 452, 453 (D. Del. 1944);
United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 5 Fed. R. Serv. 474, 476
(W.D. N.Y. 1942).
49. See Garbose v. George A. Giles Co., 14 Fed. R. Serv. 573 (D.
Mass. 1950), where the court said, "The motion is vexatious, prolix and
expensive to defendants beyond the possible value of the plaintiff's claim.
Standards for discovery in private anti-trust litigation furnish no justifica-
tion for harassing defendants with demands so broad and multifarious as
there are here presented."
1952]
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F. Discovery in the States
The discovery procedures used in the states have always been
varied and complex,,' with many differences from the federal
practice adopted in 1938.1 The cases from the jurisdictions em-
ploying discovery are too few to permit any reasonable specula-
tion as to how discovery in Minnesota will differ from that in the
federal courts. There is ample support, however, for the position
that the Federal Rules are at least an adequate model for state
practice.5
2
II. OPINIONS OF THE BAR ON THE OPERATION OF DISCOVERY53
Minnesota lawyers agree that discovery contributes to settle-
ments before trial but disagree as to the extent of the contribution.
One prominent personal injury attorney commented that it was
only necessary to compare the dispositions of his suits commenced
in state court, without the benefit of discovery, with his cases in
federal court to see that many more settlements were reached be-
cause of discovery. 54 On the other hand, another large firm engaged
in the same type of litigation stated that, in order to hold down
costs, discovery was employed only after preliminary negotiation
indicated that settlement was not probable, and that only when trial
was anticipated did discovery by interrogatories and depositions
come into play. Among those lawyers who felt that discovery did aid
settlements materially, there was no settled opinion as to whether
one type of case was affected more than others although some men-
tion was made of personal injury (motor vehicle) cases.
50. See Ragland, Discovery Before Trial, app. (1932).
51. See, e.g., Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13
Law & Contemp. Prob. 144 (1943); Pike and Willis, The New Maryland
Deposition and Discovery Procedure, 6 Md. L. Rev. 4 (1941) ; Ragland,
Discovery by Deposition, [1950] U. of Ill. Law Forum 161; Comments, 2
La. L. Rev. 525 (1940), 16 Mo. L. Rev. 45 (1951), [1938] Wis. L. Rev.
517, 531 ; 34 Minn. L. Rev. 562 (1950).
52. Van Cise, The Federal Discovery Practice Should be Adopted
by All States, 24 Wash. L. Rev. 21 (1949) ; Vliet, Oklahoma Discovery
Procedures, 2 Okla. L. Rev. 294 (1949); Williams, A Panel Discussion
Comocerning Discovery and Pre-Tral Procedure, 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 38
(1948) ; Note, [1949] U. of Ill. Law Forum 336.
53. To obtain opinions from a representative portion of the bar promi-
nent in federal practice on the use and abuse of discovery in the Minnesota
district, questions were posed to twenty-five lawyers, both plaintiffs' and
defendants' counsel. Replies received are on file at the Library of the Law
School, University of Minnesota. Comments relating to the judiciary were
derived from personal interviews.
54. The analogy was made in personal injury cases between the conduct
of counsel and a poker player with a concealed hand. Discovery discloses
the cards held by both sides and cases are settled without taking the trial
time of court and jury.
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The costs of the discovery techniques, particularly depositions,
were found not to hinder litigation when plaintiffs are incapable of
bearing heavy costs. Although some lawyers stated that discovery
reduced over-all trial expense, there is no doubt that the use of
depositions can be very expensive- and, in a few cases, it might
be a complete waste of time and money. All but one of the lawyers
polled, however, declared that on the whole discovery was well
worth the expense.
Estimates given by the attorneys as to the use of informal dis-
covery procedure in cases commenced varied from 20 per cent to
90 per cent. Some firms never used any informal discovery.',
Both the bench and the bar were of the opinion that discovery
did not delay litigation and that rather than promote perjury, it
deterred it. Some have raised the objection that discovery leads to
trial by deposition, 7 but most lawyers commented that even if it
did occur, by keeping the witness within the true facts the value
of the deposition far outweighs any such objection. In the opinion
of the lawyers, the extensive use of depositions and other discovery
to force a settlement has not occurred and is not likely to occur
in Minnesota.
The bar was well satisfied with the attention the local federal
judges give to motions and objections dealing with discovery, but
a few lawyers expressed the opinion that if the state courts are
unable properly to handle these court activities with speed, ap-
pointment of a master to hear objections and rule on motions deal-
ing with discovery might be beneficial.58
55. Some expense is reduced by formal agreement between the parties
to take depositions of parties and witnesses for both sides at the same
time; the time saved alone reduces much of the expense to the busy attorney.
But when it is necessary to take depositions in another city, even though the
depositions are taken en masse the time consumed is great, and the expense
correspondingly high.
56. To verify the use of informal discovery and further to establish the
degree of validity attributable to the statistics gathered from the dockets
and tabulated herein, lawyers were asked to note unfiled items of discovery
in random cases in which they were counsel. The replies received indicated
that interrogatories and production of documents were most often subject
to informal agreements. The average number of cases commenced in which
discovery was used but not filed was over 25 per cent. In most of the cases,
however, some discovery had already been filed and the proportion of cases
commenced in the Federal District Court in Minnesota which employed
discovery would not be raised substantially. See Table 1, infra.
57. See Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts,
60 Yale L. J. 1132, 1133 (1951).
58. It must be noted that there are many differences between federal
and state court practice and that many of the conclusions in this Note can-
not apply directly to state practice.
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The effects of the use of discovery on trial techniques were a
subject of outspoken comment by the bar. Although elimination of
surprise at the trial by the use of discovery will greatly benefit less
experienced counsel, lawyers stated that it will never replace capa-
bility and experience in trial technique. The able lawyer will con-
tinue to produce consistently with or without discovery.
The judiciary uniformly express satisfaction with the operation
of discovery. They do not believe that its prime value is the contri-
bution toward settlements but is its use as a means to reduce the
issues for trial and completely expose the facts to the trier. Appel-
late judges are especially interested in its reduction of the size of
the record.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEYS OF THE DOCKETS IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
This analysis is based on surveys of the civil dockets of divi-
sions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the United States District Court in Minne-
sota. All surveys were made by examining the cases in five types
of suits: real property, insurance, other contract, personal injury
and other tort. It was assumed that no errors of omission or classi-
fication of entries existed unless apparent on the face of the dockets.
In divisions 3 and 4 the surveys were commenced with the first
new volume of dockets begun in 1944 and were continued through
the subsequent volumes up to December 15, 1951. For division 1,
2 and 6 the only dockets available were recent, dating from March,
1949, for division 1 and from January, 1950, for divisions 2 and 6.
Only those cases which were closed at the date the surveys were
taken are included in the compilations shown by the tables appended
and in this analysis. The facts of the analysis are based on the
appended tables. It will include some facts not tabulated but will
not consider the informal use of discovery discussed previously.
A. Use of Discovery by Type of Case
Some discovery technique was found in over 29 per cent of the
cases filed in the federal district court in Minnesota. Disregarding
those cases which were disposed of by dismissal of plaintiff, and
thus rarely pressed to any extent, the proportion of cases with
discovery is raised to more than one-third of all cases filed. In
comparison with the use of discovery in some other federal dis-
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trict courts, the Minnesota district is significantly higher.59 This
result has been due in large measure to repeated and thorough use
of all the discovery devices by about twenty-five lawyers in the
district who appear often in federal court. The dockets attest to
the fact that lawyers appearing rarely in federal court were far
below the average in the use of the techniques available.
Proportionally, the discovery employed to the greatest extent
was the oral deposition. It was used almost twice as often as the
interrogatories to parties, although the latter was the only form of
discovery to appear in every category of suit. Motions for produc-
tion or inspection of documents ran a poor third, admissions were
used on the whole to an even smaller extent, and depositions upon
written interrogatories appeared to a negligible extent. Surpris-
ingly, insurance cases seemed to provide the greatest opportunities
for discovery. The proportion of such cases using discovery ex-
ceeded the proportion of personal injury cases employing discovery
by about 5 per cent and of other tort cases by about 4 per cent.
Contract cases other than insurance reflected the least use of dis-
covery, the proportion of the cases being slightly over 29 per cent;
by comparison, in insurance cases, usually more complex, dis-
covery was used in over 45 per cent of the cases. So few cases in-
volving real property were commenced in this district that no valid
evaluation can be made of the use of discovery as a whole, or by
specific technique, as an aid in such cases.
B. Discovery as Affecting the Disposition of Cases
The disposition of the cases examined in the Minnesota dis-
trict does not satisfactorily corroborate the contention that dis-
covery contributed appreciably to settlements before trial. While
over 58 per cent of the cases commenced in this district were
"stipulated and dismissed," 60 almost one-fourth of the cases com-
menced were brought to the trial stage. The national average of
trials in diversity of citizenship cases is considerably smaller,6 '
59. In five district courts surveyed, discovery was disclosed in from
14.1 per cent to 26.8 per cent of the cases; but in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania discovery was used in 37.3 per cent of the cases. See Speck,
supra note 57 at 1135.
60. This is an abbreviation of the term of art employed by the office
of the Clerk of Court. It signifies that both parties have agreed that an
order of dismissal be entered, or in other words, that a settlement has been
reached.
61. See Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts 151 (1950).
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although this may be explained by the fact that trials may be
reached more quickly in the Minnesota federal district court than
on the average elsewhere.6 2 However, it is significant that in
divisions 1, 2 and 6 of the Minnesota district discovery was pro-
portionally higher than in divisions 3 and 4 and yet virtually the
same percentage of cases reached trial.
C. Abuses Apparent from the Dockets
Few abuses were evidenced by the dockets. The race to take
depositions was the most easily discernible abuse but it occurred in
only eight cases. On five occasions defendant took the deposition of
plaintiff within a few days after service of the summons. Three
times a plaintiff applied for leave to take depositions early but the
hearings were delayed until no application to the court was neces-
sary. Delay of litigation by dilatory discovery tactics is almost
non-existent in Minnesota; only one example was found where by
several motions and hearings the case was postponed to a later
term. Usually delay by motions or objections is not likely to occur
in the federal district court in Minnesota because of the very short
trial calendars and the relatively quick availability of a hearing.0 3
But in the Minnesota state courts in the metropolitan areas, where
getting to trial takes well over a year because of clogged calendars,
it is entirely possible and very probable that the first flood of court
activity occasioned by the use of discovery under the recently
adopted Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure may delay proceed-
ings until the next term and postpone the trial even longer. Until
the mass of the legal fraternity adjust to these relatively un-
familiar devices of discovery some confusion will occur, followed by
resort to court activity. After the early confusion is somewhat
settled, however, state district court judges should be prepared to
handle quite firmly those lawyers who might be making an exces-
sive number of motions or objections dealing with discovery.
The abuse of discovery to harass the other party into a settle-
ment did not occur often enough to warrant the conclusion that
such is a practice among lawyers. Harassment was the subject of
motion only three times, and twice protective orders were granted
to limit the scope of the examination.64 The idea that corporate
62. Id. at 152-155.
63. Ibid.
64. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b). Minn. R. Civ. P. 30.02 (1952) con-
tains a similar protective provision.
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defendants have a tendency to abuse the privilege to take deposi-
tions, to the great expense of the plaintiff, is not supported in any
manner by the cases examined in the federal district court. Never-
theless, in Minnesota the new Rules expressly provide protection
from unjust expense. G
D. The Use of Interrogatories to Parties
While interrogatories were used in all types of suits, their most
frequent appearance has been in personal injury and other tort
cases. As inexpensive and convenient as interrogatories are, they
do not approach the depositions in over-all use although in the
rural divisions 1, 2 and 6, where discovery was more popular,
interrogatories were used in less than 4 per cent fewer cases than
were depositions in division 3. Not all the increase can be at-
tributed to a poorer class of plaintiff or to a less experienced
lawyer, since a large proportion of the cases were handled by the
same lawyers and firms having extensive practice in the federal
court generally.
In most cases interrogatories have been used solely to elicit
information from the adverse party as the groundwork for further
investigation, for further use of depositions of the party and his
witnesses, for admissions and for motions for production of docu-
ments. In one case plaintiff obtained from defendant corporation,
over its objection, an extensive list of all defendant's employees
working on a certain floor of a building where an alleged negli-
gent act of defendant occurred. 6 Interrogatories are frequently
used to determine whether the opposing party has obtained state-
ments from any witnesses and, if so, from whom; upon an affirma-
tive reply, a motion for production or inspection of the documents
follows. 0 7
Interrogatories are chiefly a plaintiff's weapon, particularly in
personal injury cases, and, to a lesser extent, in other tort cases.
In any type of suit in which interrogatories were used, plaintiff sub-
mitted interrogatories to defendant in all but a few instances. De-
fendant used this discovery less than half as many times as plain-
tiff in all cases and less than one-third as many times in personal
injury suits. It appears that interrogatories are of the least value
65. Minn. R. Civ. P. 30.02 (1952).
66. See Goldman v. General Mills, Civil No. 2690, D. Minn. 4th Div.,
Aug. 19, 1948.
67. The statements are not available through interrogatories, since a
"statement" is a "document." See note 27, supra and text thereto.
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in insurance and other contract cases. From the very nature of
such cases plaintiff has less need for the groundwork to determine
the existence of witnesses and documents.
There appeared to be some tendency for plaintiffs to over-use
interrogatories to such a point that in personal injury and other
tort cases defendants resorted to some court action in 25 per cent
of the cases in which interrogatories were used. Generally the ob-
jections were to irrelevancy, ambiguity or trap questions, or in-
vasion of the province of the motion to produce documents. De-
fendants' objections were upheld completely or in part in 80 per
cent of the cases.
E. "Trial by Deposition"
The oral deposition has been and will very likely always be the
discovery device most popular with and useful to lawyers. The
opportunity to examine opposing parties or witnesses at length in
the manner closely approximating the technique at trial, but with-
out the pressure of the judge and jury, has occasioned comprehen-
sive use of the deposition in all types of suits. The deposition
eliminates surprise, reveals the strength or weakness of the par-
ticular deponent under trial conditions, and allows the examiner
to run down any leads or new avenues of investigation elicited un-
expectedly during the interrogation. The popularity of the deposi-
tion to examine witnesses is manifested by the fact that such de-
positions comprised over 82 per cent of all depositions taken. In
some tort cases the number of depositions of witnesses has been
very high, with up to thirty-four depositions in one case. Doctors
are the witnesses most likely to have their depositions taken, for
where there will be dispute as to damages there would seem to be
no substitute for knowing just exactly what the medical testimony
for the other party will be.
While proportionally depositions have been used in this dis-
trict in more insurance and personal injury cases than in other
suits, the highest average number of depositions per case occurs
in other tort cases. In the latter cases the deposition was employed
on the average of five times per case, and over 91 per cent of
those whose depositions were taken were witnesses. In the insur-
ance cases, the average number of depositions was 3.5 per case,
and about 87 per cent of those taken were depositions of witnesses.
In other contract cases, the average number of depositions dropped
to about three, and witnesses comprised only about three-fourths
of the deponents.
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It was not apparent from the dockets that the deposition was
a tool for one party, nor was this evident in any particular type of
suit. And in contrast to the interrogatories, there was a marked
lack of objections and resultant court activity centering around
depositions; although five times as many depositions were taken
as interrogatories, six times as much court activity took place in
connection with the interrogatories. Expertise in trial examination,
carried over into the taking of depositions, may be responsible for
the comparative lack of court activity; in only one case was an
objection to some part of the deposition sustained, and then only
in part.
Depositions of witnesses upon written interrogatories have been
used in but few cases. Although inexpensive, and when properly
used a fair source of information,6" this type of deposition has a
serious drawback in that no probing of inconsistencies is possible.
It is unlikely that this discovery device will be used to any appre-
ciable extent except when necessitated by the pressure of more
important work or by an impecunious client with a small case.
F. Motions for Production or Inspection
The discovery of "documents . . . or tangible things"6 9 by
motion was sought in only 3.5 per cent of the cases filed in this
federal district. One explanation for this small usage may lie in
the availability of the same objects by ex parte application to the
court for a subpoena duces tecuin upon taking the oral deposition
of the party opponent.70 The importance of instruments, records and
inter-organizational reports in insurance and other contract cases
has prompted more extensive use of the motion to produce than in
tort suits.
Motions were granted only in part or denied in one-third of
the cases in which they were made. In the insurance and other
contract suits, however, less than one-fourth of the motions were
not granted as sought. In personal injury cases one-third of the
motions were denied completely and one-sixth were denied in part.
It would appear that the federal judges have given extremely care-
ful consideration to the scope of these motions and their permissi-
bility in the situation presented to the court.
68. See Note, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 712, 719 (1947).
69. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Minn. R. Civ. P. 34 (1952) is substantially the
same.
70. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (1) ; Minn R. Civ. P. 45.04(1) (1952).
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G. Admissions
The request for admission of facts or of the genuineness of
documents, like the motion for production of documents, has had
extremely small use in this district. In only 2.5 per cent of the
cases commenced were admissions requested, the greater propor-
tion again occurring in the commercial suits, insurance and other
contract. Although no documentation was made of which party
used admissions in which suits, it appeared that in all types of
suits the great majority were requested by plaintiff. 80 per cent
of the admissions requested were answered and the remainder
undoubtedly were deemed admitted by operation of Rule 36. There
were no objections to requests. No consistent connection between
the request for admission and the summary judgment was found
since in only three cases out of sixteen in which summary judg-
ments were granted was the request for admissions used.
Since one purpose of discovery by admission was the reduction
of issues before trial'71 the use of admissions in the Minnesota
district, in extent and character, might support the contention that
all pre-trial discovery is of little use in simplifying the trial al-
though valuable to prevent sturprise.
71. See Note, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 712, 725 (1947).
TABLE 1.
THE USE OF DIscOvERY IN rHE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcr COURT
IN MINNESOTA
Division 3 Division 4 Divisions 1, 2,6
(Urban) (Urban) (Rural)
Number of Cases in
Dockets Surveyed .................... 466 810 94
Cases Showing Discovery:
One or more types ................ 32.4% (151) 26.8% (217) 35.1% (33)
Depositions ......................... 18.5% ( 86) 21.4% (173) 23.4% (22)
Interrogatories .................... 10.3% ( 48) 10.7% ( 87) 14.9% (14)
Admissions ............................ 3.2% (15) 1.9% (15) 3.2% ( 3)
Production ........................... 2.6% (12) 4.4% ( 36) 1.1% (1)
Depositions by Written
Interrogatories ................ ................ 0.5% ( 4)
TABLE 2.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASES EXATMINED
Cases
Corn- Summary Settled Dismissal Stipulated
inenced Judgment by Trial of Plaintiff & Dismisscd*
Divisions3&4 ....1276 14 (1.1%) 314 (24.6%) 194 (15.2%) 754 (59.1%)
Divisions 1, 2, 6 .. 94 1 (1.1%) 23 (24.5%) 21 (22.3%) 49 (52.1%)
Total Cases ....1370 15 (1.1%) 337 (24.6%) 215 (15.7%) 803 (58.6%)
*For definition of this term see note 60, supra.
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